1 Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen [1988] (hereafter, FHP[1988] ) introduce a methodology to identify the presence of financing constraints based on the differential sensitivity of corporate investment to cash flow. Kaplan and Zingales [1997] (hereafter, KZ) provide both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that this differential sensitivity is not a valid measure of financing constraints. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1999] (hereafter, FHP [1999] ) criticize those findings. In this note, we explain that the main arguments in FHP [1999] are, in fact, quite supportive of KZ's main conclusion, while the specific criticisms in FHP [1999] are unjustified.
I.
Points of Agreement FHP [1999] admit that financially distressed firms are likely to have lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than less financially constrained firms. This is exactly the point that the KZ model makes:
investment-cash flow sensitivities are not necessarily monotonic in the degree of financing constraints.
The only disagreement FHP [1999] have with KZ is how pervasive the non-monotonicity result is. But this is ultimately an empirical question.
FHP [1999] also recognize that the literature on investment-cash flow sensitivities has not been based on a solid theoretical foundation. As KZ point out, the practice of (1) splitting the sample according to a measure of financing constraints and then (2) comparing investment-cash flow sensitivities across groups is justified only if investment-cash flow sensitivities increase monotonically in the degree of financing constraints. Neither FHP [1988] , nor any other paper of which we are aware, spell out the sufficient conditions for monotonicity.
II. Points of Disagreement
We disagree with FHP [1999] on three specific points: (1) their comparative statics analysis; (2) their criticism of the KZ classification scheme; and (3) their criticisms of the KZ empirical results.
A. Comparative Statics
As we see it, there are two ways for a firm to be more constrained than another one. (2) in FHP [1999] . 1 In this case, the appropriate condition for monotonicity is the one we report rather than the one proposed by FHP [1999] .
Alternatively, one firm may be more constrained than another because the firm's intrinsic characteristics make it more costly to raise a given amount of external funds. The appropriate comparative statics exercise requires the explicit parameterization of intrinsic firm differences. This is precisely what we did in KZ, where we introduced a parameter, k, in the cost function of external finance, C(I-W, k). In the KZ model, k represents the extent to which a firm's inherent characteristics make it more or less constrained. 2 In KZ, we discussed, but did not report, how the investment-cash flow sensitivity varied with the extent to which a firm was constrained because of its intrinsic characteristics, d 2 I/dkdW. The appropriate condition for monotonicity is that: ∂ 2 I/ ∂W∂k > 0. This derivative can be written as:
(1) (-F 11 C 112 -F 11 C 111 (∂I /∂k) + F 111 C 11 (∂I /∂k)) / (C 11 -F 11 ) 2 FHP claim that C 112 > 0 (firms with higher k have a higher slope of the external finance schedule)
is a sufficient condition for monotonicity, if F 11 is homogeneous across firms. The equation above makes it clear that this is only the case if we do not take into account the impact of the firm's intrinsic characteristics (k) on total investment (I). Notice that -F 11 C 112 > 0 if C 112 > 0, but the rest of the numerator can be either positive or negative, depending on the signs of ∂I/∂k, F 111 , and C 111 . If these derivatives were equal to zero, FHP would be correct, but this is hardly a reasonable case. In other words, the FHP condition C 112 > 0 does not guarantee monotonicity.
Substituting for ∂I/∂k in (1), the correct condition for monotonicity is: In fact, our methodology of considering management's statements of liquidity was designed precisely to reduce the ambiguity of "objective" criteria. Such a detailed analysis can distinguish between precautionary savings and pure financial slack.
For example, in 1997, Microsoft had net income of $3.5 billion, capital expenditures of $0.5 billion, no investment in inventories, no dividends, and no debt, yet held almost $9 billion of cash -or 18 times capital expenditures. By the logic of both FHP [1988] (no dividends) and FHP [1999] (high cash balances), Microsoft would be classified as financially constrained. This classification would be lent support by Microsoft's investment-cash flow sensitivity of 0.53 from 1986 to 1997 -higher than the sensitivity of the most constrained group in FHP [1988] . In contrast, by our criteria, Microsoft would qualify as not financially constrained. We believe that our classification is the more plausible one.
At the same time, the endogeneity of a firm's financial position strengthens the theoretical reasons why investment-cash flow sensitivities are not monotonically increasing in the degree of financial constraints, as recently shown by Almeida (1999) . He analyzes the response of investment to profitability shocks when leverage is endogenously determined. Firms with more liquid assets borrow more and, thus, are more sensitive to profitability shocks because of the well-known leverage effect. Less financially constrained firms, then, exhibit higher investment-cash flow sensitivities than similar firms, which have less liquid assets, and thus are more financially constrained. , FHP [1999] criticize the empirical findings in KZ on two primary dimensions.
C. Empirical Results

Finally
First, they claim the KZ results are due to the lack of heterogeneity in the sample. While it is possible that the KZ sample is homogeneous, Cleary [1999] obtains similar results for a large (over 1300) and undeniably heterogeneous sample of firms.
Second, they claim the financially constrained firms in KZ are financially distressed and the nonfinancially constrained firms are, in fact, financially constrained. As we stressed earlier, we believe that financial distress is a form of being financially constrained so that the distinction FHP [1999] make is not relevant to our arguments. Nevertheless, it is difficult to claim that the firms KZ classify as possibly financially (PFC), which exhibit the lowest sensitivity of all, are in fact distressed. For example, the median interest coverage ratio in PFC firm-years is 4.2 -which is roughly the average coverage ratio for firms rated BBB (investment grade) by Standard & Poor's.
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III. Questions for Future Research
The empirical analysis in KZ shows that less constrained firms exhibit a higher sensitivity of investments to cash flow. KZ also shows that this is perfectly compatible with value-maximizing behavior by firms facing different degrees of financing constraints. But, in practice, is the nonmonotonicity we observe driven by the value-maximizing behavior assumed in the model?
Most of the papers in this literature assume value-maximizing behavior by firms, and then attribute all observed deviations to financing constraints. In fact, it is hard to explain the high investment- have given an answer to this. We conjecture that the sensitivities are at least partially caused by excessive conservatism by managers, which may arise because of the way firms are organized internally or because of non-optimizing behavior by managers as suggested by Hines and Thaler [1995] .
